he highest good as immanent and transcendent in Kant's philosophy

Abstract

The doctrine of the highest good has given rise to numerous controversies. Indeed, several divergent interpretations have emerged in the more recent literature. Among these interpretations, one school of thought—which I will call the transcendent interpretation —holds that the highest good should be understood from an individual, transcendent, and religious perspective that emphasizes the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. A competing interpretation — which I will call the immanent interpretation — maintains that the doctrine of the highest good should be interpreted from a collective and immanent perspective, attributing a central role to the historical and political dimension. According to this line of interpretation, the emphasis placed on the concept of the “highest good in the world” in Kant’s writings of the 1790s marks a shift in perspective, in which the transcendent position of the previous decade would have been abandoned by Kant in favor of an immanent outlook. My aim is to present, in general terms, the state of the debate. I argue that, in the 1790s, Kant adopts an immanent perspective on the highest good, but does not abandon its transcendent dimension. I maintain that, from a systematic point of view, the immanent perspective is problematic and, therefore, the transcendent perspective must continue to be considered the foundation of the doctrine of the highest good.